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Abstract
Under which conditions are extrinsic credit uctuations socially optimal? In order to answer this question
we characterize constrained-e¢ cient allocations in an innite horizon, two-good economy with limited
commitment for two market structures, random pairwise meetings and centralized meetings. If agents
meet bilaterally, then constrained-e¢ cient allocations specify the highest stationary output level that is
incentive feasible, and it is implemented with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers and not-too-tightsolvency con-
straints. If agents meet in a centralized location, constrained-e¢ cient allocations can be non-stationary,
in which case they feature a credit boom followed by stagnation due to too-tightsolvency constraints.
We also characterize constrained-e¢ cient allocations under partial commitment by the planner. If com-
mitment is low, the economy experiences rare but pronounced credit crunches. If commitment is high,
the economy experiences infrequent but large credit booms.
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1 Introduction
Most nancial crises are preceded by a large build-up in private agentsdebt followed by a credit contraction
and a prolonged period of stagnation with low economic activity.1 These uctuations in the use and avail-
ability of credit are typically viewed as socially ine¢ cient as they create excess volatility relative to economic
fundamentals. In this paper we challenge this view and provide a simple environment where endogenous
credit uctuations can occur in equilibrium and are socially desirable ex ante.
The environment we consider is an innite-horizon, two-good economy similar to the one in Gu et
al. (2013b), GMMW thereafter. In the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, this economy features a role for
intertemporal trades interpreted as unsecured credit arrangements (e.g. consumption of one good in exchange
for promises of another good). Since agents lack commitment, those trades are sustained through public
monitoring.2 Using an equilibrium approach, GMMW show that this economy can generate credit cycles
due to a pecuniary externality according to which endogenous debt limits a¤ect the relative price of goods
(hence, the importance of having two goods). In brief, high debt limits in the future generate high (relative)
prices of goods consumed on credit that reduce the private gains from having access to credit in the future.
As a result, the punishment from being excluded from credit is reduced, which generates a low debt limit in
the current period.
Debt limits in GMMW are obtained by imposing the not-too-tightsolvency constraints of Alvarez and
Jermann (2000), AJ thereafter, according to which in every period agents can issue the maximum amount of
debt that is incentive-compatible with no default. While these constraints implement constrained-e¢ cient
allocations in the AJ one-good economy, it is not necessarily the case in an economy with multiple goods,
as pointed out by Kehoe and Levine (1993). Therefore, instead of taking as primitives arbitrary solvency
constraints, we derive them from a mechanism design approach which characterizes incentive-feasible alloca-
tions that maximize ex-ante welfare (see Wallace 2010 for a survey of this approach in monetary economics).
In contrast to most of this literature, with the noticeable exception of Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008), we do
not restrict the set of allocations to stationary ones and characterize instead the dynamic contracting prob-
lem between the planner and private agents. In doing so, we distinguish two market structures commonly
used in the literature, pairwise meetings and large-group meetings, and we impose the corresponding core
requirement.
1Rogo¤ (2016) argue for the existence of debt supercycles characterized by credit booms and credit crunches. Lo and Rogo¤
(2015) argue that sluggish economic growth after the onset of the nancial crisis is due to signicant pockets of private, external
and public debt overhang.
2 In the absence of public record keeping, the environment corresponds to the New-Monetarist framework of Lagos and Wright
(2005) with a few di¤erences.
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We establish the following results. If agents are matched bilaterally then the constrained-e¢ cient al-
location corresponds to the incentive-feasible, stationary allocation with the highest output level. It is
implemented with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by borrowers and not-too-tightsolvency constraints, which ex-
tends the AJ welfare theorem to economies with pairwise meetings. In such an economy, credit uctuations
would lower welfare, thereby capturing the common wisdom.
If all agents meet together in a centralized location, then the core requirement is equivalent to competitive
pricing. Under strictly convex production costs, the price of credit goods increases with aggregate consump-
tion and hence buyerssurpluses vary in a non-monotone fashion with aggregate borrowing. In turn, large
borrowing is incentive-compatible if buyers can anticipate large surpluses in the future. Therefore, in order
to extract large social gains from trade in the current period, the planner must promise low prices for future
consumption, which requires lower aggregate consumption in the future. In other words, the planner faces a
trade-o¤ between contemporaneous and future output. If preferences are such that the temptation to renege
on future promises is low (in a sense to be made precise below), then the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is
non-stationary. The initial period features an output level that is larger than the highest steady state, which
we interpret as a credit boom. It is followed by a long-lasting stagnation where output is lower than the
highest steady state due to solvency constraints that are overly tight (tighter than what is required to make
repayment incentive-feasible).
The non-stationary constrained-e¢ cient allocation is time inconsistent in that the planner would like
to revise the allocation after the initial credit boom. Our result is robust to this time-inconsistency in the
following sense. We introduce partial commitment according to which the planner can reoptimize infrequently
when a sunspot state is realized. If the planners commitment power is low, the economy experiences rare but
pronounced credit crunches. If it is high, then the economy experiences infrequent but large credit booms.
1.1 Related literature
Seminal contributions on limited-commitment economies include Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota
(1996), and AJ. We di¤er from Kocherlakota (1996) and AJ in that we study a two-good production economy
under alternative market arrangements. Our environment is a variant of the Lagos-Wright (2005) and
Rocheteau-Wright (2005) frameworks, in that we use a two-stage structure and quasi-linear preferences, but
we replace currency with a public record-keeping technology, as in Sanches and Williamson (2010, Section
4). Following GMMW, preferences are generalized to parametrize incentives to renege on obligations that
span across multiple stages. Mechanism design was rst applied to this environment with currency by Hu,
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Kennan, and Wallace (2009).3 Our implementation results are related to the Second Welfare Theorem in AJ
in that we provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which this theorem applies to our environment.
Kehoe and Levine (1993, Section 7) conjectured that punishments based on partial exclusion might allow the
implementation of socially desirable allocations.4 This conjecture is veried in our economy with the caveat
that the extent of exclusion has to vary over time. Gu et al. (2013a, Section 7) studies optimal dynamic
contracts between a lender and a borrower in a similar environment with pairwise meetings. In contrast, we
characterize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation that maximizes ex-ante social welfare, and we consider both
pairwise meetings and centralized meetings. Under centralized meetings the planner internalizes the e¤ects
of aggregate consumption on relative prices, which is key for the existence of non-stationary constrained-
e¢ cient allocations. Finally, we are related to the vast literature on equilibrium credit cycles and pecuniary
externalities including Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Myerson (2012), among others.
2 Environment
Time is discrete, goes on forever, and starts with period 0. Each date has two stages, 1 and 2. There is a
single, perishable good at each stage. There is a continuum of agents of measure two divided evenly into
buyers and sellers.5 The labels buyer and seller refer to agentsroles in stage 1: only the sellers can
produce the stage-1 good and only the buyers consume it. In each period a fraction  2 (0; 1] of buyers and
sellers chosen at random in the whole population are matched together. The remaining 1  are unmatched
and stay in autarky for one period. We will make two assumptions regarding the matching process: either
matched agents are allocated in pairs composed of one buyer and one seller or they meet in a single large
group. Matches are destroyed at the end of each period.
Preferences are additively separable over dates and stages. The stage-1 utility of a seller who produces
y 2 R+ is  v(y), while that of a buyer who consumes y is u(y), where v(0) = u(0) = 0, v and u are strictly
increasing and di¤erentiable with v convex and u strictly concave, and u0(0) = +1 > v0(0) = 0. Moreover,
there exists ~y > 0 such that v(~y) = u(~y). We dene y = argmax [u(y)  v(y)] > 0.
A buyer produces the stage-2 good by transforming ` units of stage-1 labor into ` units of stage-2 good.
3Applications of mechanism design to monetary theory include Kocherlakota (1998) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998),
Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008), Cavalcanti and Nosal (2011), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), and Hu and Rocheteau (2013, 2015),
among others. Wallace (2010) provides a review of the literature.
4Azariadis and Kass (2013) relaxed the assumption of permanent autarky and assumed that agents are only temporarily
excluded from credit markets. Gu et al. (2013a) and GMMW allow for partial monitoring, which is formally equivalent to
partial exclusion, except that the parameter governing the monitoring intensity, , is time-invariant. Kocherlakota and Wallace
(1998) consider the case of an imperfect record-keeping technology where the public record of individual transactions is updated
after a probabilistic lag.
5The assumption of ex-ante heterogeneity among agents is borrowed from Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Alternatively, one
could assume that an agents role in the DM is determined at random in every period without a¤ecting any of our results.
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Production materializes in stage 2 but ` is perfectly observable in stage 1. Sellers do not have the technology
to produce the stage-2 good. A sellers utility from consuming c units of stage-2 good is c. A buyers
utility from consuming his own output is c where  2 [0; 1] will play a key role to parameterize the limited
commitment problem. The inability of agents to commit to future actions has some bite when  > 0 because
in stage 2 buyers have incentives to renege on promises made in stage 1 by consuming their own output.
Agentscommon discount factor across periods is  = 1=(1 + r) 2 (0; 1).
Finally, there is a monitoring technology allowing all actions of matched agents to be publicly recorded.
However, agents who are matched at the beginning of a period can drop out without their participation
decision being recorded.
3 Constrained-e¢ cient allocations
We characterize constrained-e¢ cient allocations dened as allocations that maximize social welfare subject
to incentive feasibility constraints. Incentive constraints require that there are no opportunities to defect
from a proposed allocation either individually or by forming coalitions, where feasible coalitions depend on
the market structure. We will consider two alternative market structures, pairwise meetings and large-group
meetings, that imply di¤erent core requirements.
3.1 Optimal mechanism with pairwise meetings
Suppose rst that buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally. The planner chooses symmetric allocations,
f(yt; `t)g+1t=0 , in order to maximize the discounted sum of all match surpluses subject to incentive-feasibility
conditions, where yt is stage-1 output produced by sellers in a match and `t is the production of stage-2
goods by buyers in a match. This problem can be written as:
max
f(yt;`t)g
+1X
t=0
t [u(yt)  (yt)] (1)
s.t. `t 
+1X
s=1
s [u(yt+s)  `t+s] (2)
(yt)  `t  u(yt): (3)
The planners objective in (1) is the sum of buyers and sellers utilities in stage 1. It does not include
utility ows associated with the production/consumption of the stage-2 good since having buyers produce
the stage-2 good for their own consumption is socially ine¢ cient and does not help with incentive constraints,
and sellersutility of consumption cancels out with buyersdisutility of production. Inequality (2) captures
the limited commitment problem in stage 2. It guarantees that buyers prefer to deliver the stage-2 good to
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sellers instead of reneging and consuming it. The left side is a buyers utility of consuming `t units of his own
production while the right side is the discounted sum of utility ows from the proposed allocation. Implicit
in that formulation is the fact that in the presence of perfect monitoring the buyer can be punished by
permanent autarky from departing from the proposed allocation, which generates a continuation value equal
to 0. (It is easy to check that strategies that consist of punishing defectors form a sequential equilibrium.
See Bethune, Hu, and Rocheteau, 2017, for a detailed characterization of all equilibria.) The conditions in
(3) are participation constraints of matched buyers and sellers in stage 1. Since matched agents can choose
to drop out and stay in autarky for one period without their action being recorded, we need to make sure
that they receive a positive surplus from their intra-period trades, where a buyers surplus is u(yt)  `t and
a sellers surplus is  (yt) + `t. Coalition-proofness in pairwise meetings requires that yt  y, which is
satised endogenously (and hence ignored thereafter). We call a solution to (1)-(3) a constrained-e¢ cient
allocation (cea thereafter).
For a given fytg, a necessary condition for participation constraints to hold is that they hold when
`t = v(yt). As a result, the incentive constraints can be collapsed into a single inequality,
(yt) 
+1X
s=1
s [u(yt+s)  (yt+s)] : (4)
This reduced participation constraint shows that higher future output in [0; y] relaxes the participation
constraint allowing for larger current output. In the following we use ymax to denote the highest, stationary
level of output consistent with (4). It is the unique positive solution to r(ymax) =  [u(ymax)  (ymax)].
Proposition 1 (cea under pairwise meetings)
1. If y  ymax, then any cea is such that yt = y and `t 2 [v(y); `] for all t 2 N0, where ` = [u(y) 
v(y)]=r.
2. If y > ymax, then the cea is such that yt = ymax and `t = v(yt) for all t 2 N0.
If agents are su¢ ciently patient (r low) and if the temptation to renege is not too large ( low), then rst-
best allocations are implementable. The equilibrium size of ` is indeterminate when y < ymax, and we give
an upper bound, `, for it (which may not be achievable every period). In contrast, if r >  [u(y)=(y)  1],
then the cea is yt = ymax < y, which corresponds to the highest steady state.
We now turn to the implementation of the cea with an explicit bargaining protocol and solvency con-
straints. Suppose buyers set the terms of the loan contract unilaterally and cannot promise to repay more
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than some endogenous debt limit, dt. The value function of a buyer solves
V bt = max
yt;`t

u(yt)  `t + V bt+1
	
+ (1  )V bt+1 s.t. `t = (yt)  dt. (5)
With probability , a buyer is matched in stage 1 in which case he extends an o¤er, (yt; `t), that makes
the seller indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, `t   (yt) = 0. The o¤er must also satisfy a solvency
constraint according to which the buyer cannot promise to repay more than dt. The solution is yt =
min

y;  1(dt)
	
. The highest debt limit that is consistent with repayment, the not-too-tight solvency
constraint of AJ, solves dt = V bt+1. In a stationary equilibrium it solves rd =  [u(y)  v(y)] where
y = min

y;  1(d)
	
. If rv(y)   [u(y)  v(y)] then d  v(y) and y = y  ymax. If rv(y) >
 [u(y)  v(y)] then d = v(ymax) < v(y) and y = ymax < y, which corresponds to ceas in Proposition 1.
Hence, we have the following implementation result.
Proposition 2 (Second Welfare Theorem for economies with pairwise meetings) The cea is im-
plemented with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers under not-too-tight solvency constraints.
Notice that the cea is not uniquely implemented by the optimal mechanism. Indeed, under buyer take-
it-or-leave-o¤er, any sequence fdtg that satises
dt = f[u(yt+1)  v(yt+1)] + dt+1g (6)
with yt+1 = minfv 1(dt+1); yg corresponds to an equilibrium under not-too-tightsolvency constraints. It
is straightforward to check that there are a continuum of equilibria satisfying (6), and any such equilibrium
with d0 < v(ymax) converges to the autarky steady state. The cea is the only bounded sequence that does
not converge to the autarky equilibrium.6
3.2 Optimal mechanism with large-group meetings
Suppose next that a fraction  of buyers and sellers meet together in a centralized location. If we only impose
individual rationality, then the planners problem is subject to the same incentive constraints as before, (2)
and (3), and Proposition 1 holds. However, the restriction according to which no coalition of agents within
a meeting can defect from the proposed allocation is binding when 00 > 0. Indeed, suppose the allocation
is as in Proposition 1 where each seller receives v(y) for producing y. Now a buyer and two sellers can form
a deviating coalition in which each seller produces yt=2 at a total cost of 2(yt=2) < (yt) and the buyer
compensates the sellers by o¤ering them a positive surplus. In order to prevent such defections we impose
the core requirement or, equivalently, the competitive equilibrium outcome as in Kehoe and Levine (1993)
6For related results in the context of the AJ model see Bloise et al. (2013).
6
and AJ.7 Matched agents take the price of stage-1 goods in terms of stage-2 goods, p, as given, and by sellers
optimization, p = v0(y). Hence, in exchange for consuming y of the stage-1 good the buyer must deliver
(y) = v0(y)y of the stage-2 good. This core requirement also implies that y  y.
We are now ready to formulate the planners problem analogous to (1)-(3). The objective function is still
(1). The reduced participation constraint, (4), now becomes
(yt) 
+1X
s=1
s [u(yt+s)  (yt+s)] ; (7)
and we have the requirement that yt  y for all t. In supplemental appendix S2 we show that we can
reformulate this problem in a recursive manner, by introducing the buyers guaranteed minimum utility,
!t, as a new state variable.8 It is shown there that societys welfare, denoted V (!), solves the following
Bellman equation,
V (!) = max
y;!0
f [u(y)  v(y)] + V (!0)g (8)
s.t.  (y) + !
0

 0 (9)
!0  (1 + r) f!    [u(y)  (y)]g (10)
y 2 [0; y]; !0 2 [0; !] ; (11)
where ! = maxy2[0;y] [u(y)  (y)] =(1  ) is an upper bound for the lifetime expected utility of a buyer
across all incentive feasible allocations. This upper bound is computed by assigning the maximum surplus
to buyers in every period. This allocation, however, might not satisfy the stage-2 participation constraint,
(9). This incentive constraint is derived from the participation constraint, (7), and it says a buyer is better
o¤ delivering (y) units of stage-2 good so that he can enjoy the future utility from the proposed allocation,
!0, rather than consuming his own output, which was intended for sellersconsumption, and enjoy utility
(y). The novelty is the promise-keeping constraint, (10), according to which the guaranteed minimum
lifetime expected utility promised to a buyer along the equilibrium path, !, is implemented by generating
an expected surplus in the current period equal to  [u(y)  (y)] and by promising !0 for the future.
We dene two critical values for stage-1 output:
y^ = arg max
y2[0;y]
[u(y)  (y)] (12)
ymax = maxfy > 0 : [u(y)  (y)]  r(y)g: (13)
7See Wallace (2013) for a related assumption in the context of monetary economies. The equivalence result between the
core and competitive equilibrium allocations for economies with a continuum of agents was rst shown by Aumann (1964). See
supplementary appendix S1 for a proof of this equivalence result in the context of our model.
8Our recursive formulation is similar to the self-generation technique in Abreu et al. (1990), which characterizes the set of
payo¤s generated by Perfect Public Equilibria.
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The quantity y^ is the output level that maximizes the buyers surplus in stage 1. The quantity ymax is the
highest, stationary level of output that is consistent with the buyers participation constraint. We assume
that both y^ and ymax are well-dened and, for all 0  y  ymax, [u(y)  (y)]  r(y).
Proposition 3 Suppose that y > ymax > y^. There is a unique solution to (8)-(11) in the space of contin-
uous and bounded functions. It is weakly decreasing in ! and concave provided that  is convex.
Using that V is weakly decreasing in ! and the fact that !0 is a choice variable of the planner, the
maximum value for societys welfare is V (0) = max!2[0;!] V (!). This gives us the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 (cea under centralized meetings) Assume  is a convex function.
1. If y  ymax, then the cea is such that yt = y for all t 2 N0.
2. If ymax  y^  y , then the cea is such that yt = ymax for all t 2 N0.
3. If y^ < ymax < y then there are two cases:
(a) If    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)], then the cea is such that yt = ymax for all t 2 N0.
(b) If  <  [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)], then the cea is such that y0 2 (ymax; y) and yt = y1 2 (y^; ymax)
for all t  1, where (y0; y1) is the unique solution to
max
y0;y1

u(y0)  v(y0) + u(y1)  v(y1)
r

(14)
s.t. (y0) =
[u(y1)  (y1)]
r
: (15)
Provided that agents are su¢ ciently patient, r  [u(y)  (y)]=(y), the cea coincides with a rst-
best allocation. Note that the condition to implement the rst best is more stringent than the one under
pairwise meetings since (y)  v(y), with a strict inequality when v00 > 0. If ymax < y then the rst best
violates the buyersparticipation constraint, in which case the characterization of the cea depends on the
ordering of ymax and y^. As shown in the left panel of Figure 1, if ymax  y^ then a buyers intra-period surplus
and societys welfare are both increasing with y over (0; ymax). Hence, by raising buyersconsumption in the
future the planner relaxes the current participation constraint allowing for more consumption today. So the
highest steady state, y = ymax, is constrained e¢ cient.
We now turn to the case where y^ < ymax < y. For all y 2 (y^; y) a buyers surplus, u(y)   (y),
decreases with y whereas societys surplus, u(y)  v(y), increases with y, as illustrated in the right panel of
Figure 1. A buyers surplus decreases for y > y^ because of a pecuniary externality according to which an
8
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Figure 1: Let panel: No trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and incentives over [0; ymax]; Right panel: A trade-o¤
between e¢ ciency and incentives over [y^; y].
increase in aggregate consumption raises the price of stage-1 goods, p = v0(y), which lowers u(y)  py when
y is su¢ ciently close to y.9 The negative relationship between buyerssurplus and aggregate consumption
gives rise to an intertemporal trade-o¤ between current and future output. Indeed, in order to raise current
buyersconsumption the planner must relax the repayment constraint, which requires lower future prices
and hence lower aggregate consumption in the future. As a result of this trade-o¤, the highest steady state,
ymax, might no longer be the solution to the planners problem.
A key result allowing us to characterize the cea in closed form is that it is always socially optimal to
keep future output constant, yt = y1 for all t  1. Indeed, we prove that whenever the utility promised to
buyers is ! > !max = [u(ymax)  (ymax)]=(1  ) , the repayment constraint is slack and it is optimal to
set !0 = !, which is achieved by keeping consumption constant. In order to establish that !1  !max we use
a guess-and-verify method allowing us to compute V (!) in closed-form. If ! 2 (!max; !], !0 = ! and from
(8)
V (!) =
 [u(y)  v(y)]
1   with  [u(y)  (y)] = (1  )!:
Moreover, we show that V (!) = V (!max) for all ! < !max when    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)]. Figure 2
plots V (!) for three cases in Proposition 4. When ymax  y^  y (case 2), V (!) is constant and the cea is
stationary at yt = ymax and !t = !max for t  1. As  decreases (cases 3a and 3b), the temptation to renege
9The existence of such pecuniary externality in monetary economies with competitive trades and their welfare implications
are discussed in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2014, 2016).
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is lower and V (!) shifts upward. Moreover, it is downward sloping for ! > !max.
Figure 2: Value functions for  2 f2:0; 0:5; 0:17g,  = 1,  = 0:4, u(y) = y, v(y) = 0:32  y3:1.
If the rst best cannot be achieved, a buyers participation constraint at t = 0 must be binding since
otherwise y0 could be raised without a¤ecting any future incentive constraints. As a result the buyers
participation constraint at t = 0 is given by (15) and the magnitude of the trade-o¤ between current and
future output in the neighborhood of the highest steady state is:
dy1
dy0

ymax
=
r0(ymax)
[u0(ymax)  0(ymax)] < 0:
When    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)] exploiting this trade-o¤ is harmful since one would have to implement
a large drop in future output in order to raise current output by a small amount while maintaining a buyers
incentive to deliver the stage-2 good.
In contrast, when  is small, it is optimal to exploit the trade-o¤ between current and future output
arising from (15). The optimal allocation is such that y0 > ymax while y1 < ymax. The initial period is
interpreted as a credit boom and future periods correspond to a stagnation phase. Even though, in future
periods, society would be better-o¤ at the highest steady state, u(y1)   v(y1) < u(ymax)   v(ymax), buyers
enjoy a higher surplus, u(y1)   (y1) > u(ymax)   (ymax), which relaxes their incentive constraint for
repayment at t = 0. As a result, output and societys welfare in the initial period are higher than the highest
steady-state levels, u(y0)  v(y0) > u(ymax)  v(ymax).10
10Kehoe and Levine (1993) provide an example where partial exclusion leads to a welfare-improving outcome. See their
Example 2 on p. 875.
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In Figure 3 we illustrate the determination of (y0; y1). The red curve labeled IR corresponds to (15). It
slops downward because of the trade-o¤ between current and future output described above. By denition
the IR curve intersects the 45o-line at ymax. The blue curve labeled FOC corresponds to the rst-order
condition of the problem (14)-(15). Given the strict concavity of the surplus function it is optimal to smooth
consumption by increasing y0 when y1 increases. When  is low the FOC curve is located above the IR curve
at y1 = ymax. Hence, the optimal solution, denoted (y0 ; y

1 ), is such that y

0 > y
max and y1 < y
max.
0y
1y
*y
*y
m axy
m axy
**
0y
**
1y
IR
FOC
Figure 3: Determination of the constrained-e¢ cient allocation, (y0; y1)
We now turn to the implementation of the cea with competitive trades and solvency constraints. The
value function of a buyer solves
V bt =  max
ptytdt

u(yt)  ptyt + V bt+1
	
+ (1  )V bt+1, (16a)
where pt = v0(yt) by market clearing. The solution is such that yt = y if v0(y)y  dt and v0(yt)yt = dt
otherwise. The sequence of debt limits, fdtg, must satisfy dt  V bt+1. Bethune et al. (2017) species
strategies that sustain any such sequence fdtg as an equilibrium outcome. Solvency constraints are said
to be not-too-tightwhen the previous inequality holds at equality. In order to implement y = ymax in
all periods the debt limit must coincide with the not-too-tight solvency constraint, i.e., it solves rd =
 f[u(y)  v0(y)y]g. If the cea is non-stationary then (y0; y1) is implemented with debt limits d0 = v0(y0)y0
and d1 = v0(y1)y1 where d1 < d0 =  f[u(y1)  v0(y1)y1]g =r. The following implementation result then
follows from Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 (Second Welfare Theorem under large-group meetings) Assume that  is a convex
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function.
1. If either ymax  y^  y or y^ < ymax < y and    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)], then the cea is imple-
mented with not-too-tight solvency constraints.
2. If y^ < ymax < y and  <  [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)], then the cea is implemented with slack repayment
constraints (i.e., too-tight solvency constraints) in all future periods, t  1.
The failure of the AJ Welfare Theorem in the second part of the Corollary is surprising as one would
conjecture that higher debt limits allow society to generate larger gains from trade. This reasoning is valid
in a static sense. If dt increases, the sum of all surpluses in period t,  [u(yt)  v(yt)], increases. However,
there is a general equilibrium e¤ect according to which an increase in dt raises the price of stage-1 goods. If
the economy is close enough to the rst best, this pecuniary externality lowers buyerswelfare (even though
society as a whole is better o¤) and worsens their incentive to repay their debt in earlier periods.
The conditions in the second part of the Corollary are satised for all the numerical examples in GMMW.
However, GMMW impose not-too-tight solvency constraints as part of their equilibrium solution. Our
results show that these constraints fail to implement ceas and hence the equilibrium cycles in GMMW are
dominated in terms of ex-ante welfare by equilibria with too-tightsolvency constraints.
3.3 Optimal stochastic credit cycles
If the cea characterized in Proposition 4 is non-stationary, then it is also time-inconsistent in the following
sense: if the planner were to re-optimize at a later date, when the economy is in permanent stagnation,
it would want to deviate and generate a new credit boom. In order to address this time inconsistency we
now study equilibria where the realization of a sunspot state allows the planner to re-optimize. We think
of the planner as having partial (or loose) commitment.11 This sunspot occurs at the beginning of a period
with probability , where  parameterizes the strength of the planners commitment. The planners problem
becomes:
V (!) = max
y;!0
f [u(y)  v(y)] +  [(1  )V (!0) + V (0)]g (17)
s.t.  (y) +  [(1  )!
0 + !0]

 0 (18)
(1  )!0 + !0  (1 + r) f!    [u(y)  (y)]g (19)
y 2 [0; y]; !0 2 [0; !] ; (20)
11This approach is analogous to the formalization of partial or loose commitment by Debortolia and Nunes (2010) and
Kovrijnykh (2013).
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where !0 is the lifetime expected utility of a buyer at the beginning of a cycle when the sunspot state is
realized, i.e.,
!0 =
[1  (1  )]P+1=0 [(1  )] [u(y )  (y )]
1   ; (21)
where fyg is stage-1 consumption chosen by the planner. Notice that when choosing fyt; !t+1g the planner
takes !0 as given, i.e., he takes the choice of his future-self when he has the opportunity to reoptimize as
given. Hence, the solution to the planners problem under partial commitment involves solving a xed point
problem. According to (17), the planner is committed to his promise of future utility, !0, with probability
1   . With probability  the planner reoptimizes, in which case its continuation value is V (0) = V (!0)
and the buyers expected utility is !0. According to (18), a buyer who reneges on his obligation to repay
(y) gives up the expected continuation value (1  )!0 + !0. The promise-keeping constraint, (19), states
that a buyers discounted expected utility,  [(1  )!0 + !0], must be equal to the initial promise net of
the expected surplus in the current period. Finally, taking !0 as given, the highest expected utility a buyer
can be promised is
! =
maxy2[0;y] [u(y)  (y)] + !0
1  (1  ) : (22)
Given !0, V (!) can be computed by iterations of value functions. The policy function gives fyg which
allows us to update !0 and re-compute V (!). We iterate this procedure until convergence, i.e., until we nd
a xed point.
Figure 4: Optimal sunspot equilibria
In Figure 4 we illustrate the solution to the planners problem for the parametrization  = 0:1,  = 0:1,
u(y) = y, v(y) = y1:5=1:5, and for  2 f0:01:0:5; 0:99g. For each  we generate a sequence of realizations for
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the sunspot state and we plot the associated path for stage-1 output. The solution to the planners problem
is qualitatively similar to the one described in Proposition 4. At the start of the cycle, when the sunspot
state is realized, output increases to some level y0 > ymax. For all subsequent periods until the next sunspot
realization, output is low at y1 < ymax. As the stochastic cycle repeats itself, the economy alternates through
credit booms and busts of random lengths.
As  approaches 1, e.g.,  = 0:99 in Figure 4, y0 converges to ymax. If the commitment power is very
low, credit booms are small but they happen in almost all periods. From an outside observer, these booms
are normal times. When the sunspot is not realized, which happens 1% of the time, output falls sharply and
the economy goes through a credit crunch. With low commitment, the economy appears to experience rare
but pronounced credit crunches.
As  approaches 0, e.g.,  = 0:01 in Figure 4, (y0; y1) converges to the full commitment cea. In the
infrequent event when the sunspot occurs, the economy experiences a credit boom and output increases
above ymax. Following the boom, output falls slightly below ymax. So with high commitment, the economy
experiences rare but large credit booms.
For intermediate values for , e.g.,  = 0:5 in Figure 4, y0 is signicantly larger than ymax while y1
is signicantly lower than ymax and both output levels occur frequently. The equilibrium features optimal
(given ) business cycle uctuations driven by endogenous changes in the availability of credit.
Figure 5: Unanticipated increase in 
So far the state allowing agents to coordinate on an equilibrium does not a¤ect fundamentals it is pure
extrinsic uncertainty. Alternatively, the planner could reoptimize  i.e., agents could coordinate on a new
equilibrium following the realization of real shocks. As an example, consider an unexpected increase in the
preference parameter  at t = 0 from 0  = 0:142 to 0+ = 0:147 as illustrated in Figure 5 for  = 0:95,
u(y) = y, v(y) =
p
y, and  = 0:5. The change in fundamentals makes the incentive problem more severe.
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For all t < 0, yt = y1 corresponding to the initial cea. At t = 0 agents coordinate on the constrained-e¢ cient
equilibrium corresponding to the new value of . Output and debt levels increase initially and then they fall
to a permanently lower level. So there is a temporary credit boom followed by a permanent credit bust and
a permanent reduction in output below the initial steady state. These allocations are optimal at time t = 0.
4 Conclusion
We asked whether extrinsic credit uctuations could be socially optimal. To answer this question we charac-
terized constrained-e¢ cient allocations of a two-good, pure credit economy under limited commitment. We
showed that if agents interact through random, pairwise meetings, then constrained-e¢ cient allocations are
constant through time and exhibit the highest output level that is incentive feasible. Such allocations can
be implemented with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers/borrowers and not-too-tightsolvency constraints.
If agents meet in a centralized location, thereby allowing for a larger set of feasible deviations, then the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation can be non-stationary. In such cases optimal allocations are characterized by
an initial credit boom with high output followed by a permanent stagnation with low output. Moreover,
constrained-e¢ cient allocations are not implemented with not-too-tightsolvency constraints, in contrast
to AJ and GMMW. Indeed, it is optimal to have slack participation constraints in all future periods by
restricting borrowing in order to lower future prices and relax the repayment constraint in the initial period.
Because the planners solution is time-inconsistent  the planner would like to renege on the stagnation and
create a new credit boom  we also solved the planners problem under various degrees of commitment.
If commitment is weak, the economy experiences rare but pronounced credit crunches. If commitment is
strong, then the economy experiences infrequent but large credit booms.
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Appendix: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. (1) Suppose that y  ymax. Then, the outcome f(yt; `t)g1t=0 with yt = y and
`t = v(yt) for all t is implementable, which is the rst-best and hence is cea. Now, suppose that f(yt; `t)g1t=0
is a cea. Then, yt = y for all t, and since equilibrium requires `t  v(yt) for all t, (2) implies that
`t 
+1X
s=1
s[u(yt+s)  v(yt+s)] = 1
r
[u(y)  v(y)];
and hence `t  `.
(2) Suppose that y > ymax. We show that the optimal sequence that has yt = ymax and `t = v(yt) for
all t. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is another sequence fy0t; `0tg1t=0 satisfying (2) and (3) with a
strictly higher welfare. It then follows that y  y0t > ymax for some t. Let t0 be the rst t such that
u(y0t) v(y0t) > u(ymax) v(ymax). Now we show that for some t1 > t0, y0t1 > y0t0 . Suppose, by contradiction,
that y0t  y0t0 for all t > t0. We have the following inequality,
v(y0t0)  `0t0   1
+1X
s=1
s

u(y0t0+s)  `0t0+s
   1 +1X
s=1
s

u(y0t0)  v(y0t0)

;
where the rst inequality follows from the sellers participation constraint, (3), at t = t0, the second follows
from the buyers participation constraint, (2), and the third follows from u(y0t0+s)   `0t0+s  u(y0t0+s)  
v(y0t0+s)  u(y0t0)  v(y0t0) since u  v is increasing for y < y and `0t0+s  v(y0t0+s) for all s. Because ymax is
the maximal value of y0t0 that equalizes the left side and the right side of this series of inequalities, it follows
that y0t0  ymax, a contradiction. So y  y0t1 > y0t0 for some t1 (and we choose t1 > t0 to be the rst index
for this to happen). By induction, we can then nd a subsequence fy0tig that is strictly increasing and is
bounded from above. So there exists a limit ey = limi!1 y0ti > ymax. Hence, by monotonicity, we have for
all i,
rv(y0ti)  r`ti 
[u(ey)  v(ey)]

;
and, by taking i to innity, we have
rv(ey)  [u(ey)  v(ey)]

:
However, as explained above, this implies that ey  ymax, and this leads to a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. First we prove that there is a unique solution to the Bellman equation. We
begin by showing that, for any ! 2 [0; !], the set of elements (y; !0) 2 [0; y]  [0; !] satisfying (9)-(11) is
nonempty and hence the maximization problem is well-dened. For all ! 2 [0; !], dene y!  y^  y as the
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unique solution to
! =

1   [u(y!)  (y!)]: (23)
As u(0)   (0) = 0 and 1  [u(y^)   (y^)] = !, such y! 2 [0; y^] exists by the Intermediate Value Theorem.
We claim that (y!; !0) satises (9)-(11) for any !0 2 [!; !]. First (11) holds by construction. Moreover,
rearranging (23), we have
! = !   [u(y!)  (y!)]
which implies (10) for any !0  !. Finally, by (23) and the fact that y  y^  ymax,
(y!)  !

 !
0

for any !0  !.
Proof. We now show that the Bellman equation (8)-(11) has a unique solution. Let C[0; !] be the
complete metric space of continuous functions over [0; !] equipped with the sup norm. Dene T : C[0; !]!
C[0; !] by
T (W )(!) = max
y;!0
f [u(y)  v(y)] + W (!0)g ;
subject to (9)-(11). Note that T (W ) 2 C[0; !] by the Theorem of Maximum. The mapping T satises the
Blackwell su¢ cient condition (Lucas and Stokey, 1989, Theorem 3.3), and hence T is a contraction mapping,
which admits a unique xed point by the Banach Fixed-Point Theorem. Hence, V is the unique solution to
the Bellman equation and is continuous.
Notice that by decreasing ! we increase the set of (y; !0) that satises (9)-(11), but without a¤ecting the
objective function. Hence, V is weakly decreasing.
Now we prove that V is weakly decreasing in !, assuming that  is convex. To show that V is concave, we
show that T preserves concavity. Let !0; !1 2 [0; !] be given. Let (y0; !0) and (y1; !1) solves (9)-(11) for !0
and !1, respectively. let  2 (0; 1) be given. Then,
T (W )(!0 + (1  )!1)
  [u(y0 + (1  )y1)  v(y0 + (1  )y1)] + W (!00 + (1  )!01)
 [u(y0)  v(y0)] + (1  )[u(y0)  v(y0)] + [W (!00) + (1  )W (!00)]
= T (W )(!0) + (1  )T (W )(!1):
The rst inequality follows from the fact that (y0 + (1   )y1; !00 + (1   )!01) also satises (9)-(11) for
! = !0 + (1  )!1 because  is convex. The second inequality follows from the concavity of u  v and the
assumed concavity of W .
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Proof of Proposition 4. The program that selects the best PBE is
max
fytg1t=0
+1X
t=0
t [u(yt)  (yt)] (24)
s.t. (yt)  
+1X
s=1
s [u(yt+s)  (yt+s)] (25)
yt  y for all t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (26)
(1) Suppose that y  ymax. In this case, the outcome fytg1t=0 with yt = y for all t is implementable
and hence is the cea
(2) Suppose that y > ymax but ymax  y^. We show that the outcome fytg1t=0 with yt = ymax for
all t is the optimum. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is another outcome fy0tg1t=0 satisfying (25) and
(26) with a strictly higher welfare. First we show that y0t  y^ for all t. Suppose, by contradiction, that there
is a t such that y0t > y^. Then, because y^  ymax,
(y0t) > (y^) 
1X
s=1
s[u(y^)  (y^)] 
1X
s=1
s[u(y0t+s)  (y0t+s)];
a contradiction to (25). Given that this alternative outcome can only lie in the range [0; y^] and hence the
trade surplus is increasing in the output, the rest of the arguments are exactly the same as those in the proof
of Proposition 1.
(3) Suppose that y^ < ymax < y. As mentioned, we can solve the planners problem by solving the
Bellman equation (8)-(11) and by choosing !0. Moreover, by Proposition 3, the value function V is unique,
and it is nonincreasing and concave. Hence, we may choose !0 = 0. After solving the Bellman equation
and the policy functions, denoted by !0(!t) and y(!t), the cea can then by computed by !t+1 = !0(!t),
yt = y(!t), and `t = (yt).
The Lagrangian associated with the Bellman equation (8)-(11) is
L =  [u(y)  v(y)] + V (!0) + 


!0

  (y)

+ f [u(y)  (y)] + !0   !g ; (27)
where the Lagrange multipliers,  and , are non-negative. In general V may not be di¤erentiable everywhere.
However, because V is concave, the following rst-order conditions are still necessary and su¢ cient for (y; !0)
to be optimal (Clarke (1976), Theorems 1 and 2):
 [u0(y)  v0(y)]  0(y) +  [u0(y)  0(y)] = 0 (28)
V 0+(!
0) + 


+   0  V 0 (!0) + 


+ ; (29)
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where V 0+(!
0) = lim!#!0 V 0(!) and V 0 (!
0) = lim!"!0 V 0(!). Both V 0+(!
0) and V 0 (!
0) exist because of
concavity. The envelope condition, provided that V 0(!) exists, is
V 0(!) =  : (30)
We dene two critical values for the buyers promised utility:
!max =
 [u(ymax)  (ymax)]
1   and ! =
[u(y^)  (y^)]
1   :
The rst threshold is the buyers life-time expected utility at the highest steady state, while the second is
the maximum life-time expected utility achieved by the buyers across all steady states. Note that by the
denition of ymax, (ymax) = !max=.
(a)    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)] :
The following claim provides conditions under which the constrained-e¢ cient allocation corresponds to
the highest steady state. In order to establish this claim, we shows that, for ! = 0 and ! = !max, the
optimal solution to the maximization problem in (8)-(11) is (!max; ymax).
Claim 1 If y^ < ymax < y and    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)], then the unique solution to (8)-(11) is
V (!) =
 [u(ymax)  v(ymax)]
1   if ! 2 [0; !
max]; (31)
=
 fu[g(!)]  v[g(!)]g
1   if ! 2 (!
max; !]; (32)
where g(!) is the unique solution to [u(y)  (y)] = (1  )! for all ! 2 (!max; !].
The function V given by (31)-(32) is at in the interval [0; !max] and is strictly concave for all ! 2
(!max; !), and hence is concave overall. To show the strict concavity, we compute V 00(!) for all ! 2 (!max; !).
By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
g0(!) =
1  
fu0[g(!)]  0[g(!)]g < 0;
and hence
V 0(!) =
u0[g(!)]  v0[g(!)]
u0[g(!)]  0[g(!)] (33)
for all ! 2 (!max; !). Thus,
V 00(!) =
fu00[g(!)]  v00[g(!)]gfu0[g(!)]  0[g(!)]g
fu0[g(!)]  0[g(!)]g2 g
0(!)
+
 fu0[g(!)]  v0[g(!)]gfu00[g(!)]  00[g(!)]g
fu0[g(!)]  0[g(!)]g2 g
0(!) < 0:
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Note that, for all ! 2 (!max; !), u0[g(!)]   0[g(!)] < 0 as g(!) > y^ and that u0[g(!)]   v0[g(!)] > 0 as
g(!)  ymax < y.
To prove that V satises (31) and (32), we consider two cases.
(i) Suppose that ! 2 [0; !max]. The solution to the maximization problem in (8)-(11) is given by (!0; y) =
(!max; ymax). This solution is feasible because (!max; ymax) satises (10) for all !  !max and it satises (9)
at equality. Next, we show that it satises (28)-(29) with  = 0 and
 =
[u0(ymax)  v0(ymax)]
0(ymax)
> 0:
The condition (28) holds by the denition of . To establish (29), rst note that V 0 (!
max) = 0 and
V 0+(!
max)  lim
!#!max
V 0(!) =
u0(ymax)  v0(ymax)
u0(ymax)  0(ymax) :
Thus, V 0 (!
max) + = > 0 and the rst inequality in (29) holds if and only if
V 0+(!
max) +


=
1

[u0(ymax)  v0(ymax)]
0(ymax)

+ 
0(ymax)
u0(ymax)  0(ymax)

 0;
and, because y^ < ymax < y and hence u0(ymax)   v0(ymax) > 0 and u0(ymax)   0(ymax) < 0, the last
inequality holds if and only if


u0(ymax)
0(ymax)
  1

  ;
that is,    [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)]. This implies V satises (31).
(ii) Suppose that ! 2 (!max; !). Here we show that (!0; y) = (!; g(!)) is the solution to the maximization
problem in (8)-(11). This solution is feasible: (10) holds by construction; because !0 = ! = [u(y)  
(y)]=(1  ) and because y = g(!)  ymax,
(y)  [u(y)  (y)]=(1  );
(9) holds. Next, we show that the FOCs (28) and (29) are satised by (!0; y) = (!; g(!)) with  = 0 and
 =  u
0[g(!)]  v0[g(!)]
u0[g(!)]  0[g(!)] > 0:
The FOC for y, (28), holds by the denition of . The FOC for !0, (29), holds if and only if
 + V 0(!) = 0;
which holds by (33). Thus, if !0 = ! 2 (!max; !), then the optimal sequence is (!t; yt) = (!; g(!)) for all t.
Hence, V (!) is satises (32) for all ! 2 (!max; !). Finally, V satises (32) at ! = ! by continuity.
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(b)  <  [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)] :
We will show that V (!) has the same closed-form solution as derived in claim 1 when ! > !max. Given
this observation, we will establish that if ! = 0 then !0 > !max and y can be solved in closed form.
Claim 2 Suppose that y^ < ymax < y and  <  [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)]. Then, there exists a unique
(y0; y1) with y^ < y1 < ymax < y0 < y that solves (14)-(15), and the unique V that solves (8)-(11) satises
V (!) = [u(y0)  v(y0)] + 
1  [u(y1)  v(y1)] if ! = 0; (34)
=

1   fu[g(!)]  v[g(!)]g if ! 2 [!
max; !]; (35)
where g(!) is given in Part 1.
The fact that V satises (35) follows the proof of the second case in the claim in the proof of Part 1 and
the Contraction Mapping Theorem. Note that by (35), V 0(!) is given by (33) for ! > !max and hence the
proof there applies exactly.
Here we show (34). First we rewrite the problem in (8)-(11) at ! = 0 as follows:
max
y;!0
f [u(y)  v(y)] + V (!0)g (36)
s.t.   (y) + !
0

 0 (37)
y 2 [0; y]; !0 2 [0; !] : (38)
Note that (10) is trivially satised when ! = 0. Now, conjecturing that !0  !max, we can replace V (!0) by
the expression given by (35), y by y0 and g(!0) by y1, and transform the above problem to
max
(y0;y1)2[0;y][y^;ymax]

 [u(y0)  v(y0)] + u(y1)  v(y1)
r

(39)
s.t.  (y0) + u(y1)  (y1)
r
 0; (40)
which is exactly the same as (14)-(15). By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, a pair (y0; y1) solves the above
problem if it satises the following FOC and feasibility condition:
u0(y0)  v0(y0)
0(y0)
=  


u0(y1)  v0(y1)
u0(y1)  0(y1)

(41)
[u(y1)  (y1)] = r(y0): (42)
In order to show that the solution (y0; y1) is also a solution to the problem in (8)-(11) at ! = 0 we only need
to verify our conjecture,
!1 =
1
1  [u(y1)  (y1)] > !
max;
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because the necessary conditions, (41)-(42), are also su¢ cient by the concavity of V over its entire domain.
Now we show that there exists a unique pair (y0; y1) with y^ < y1 < ymax < y0 < y that satises
(41)-(42). For each y1 2 (y^; ymax], dene
h(y1) = 
 1
h 
r
[u(y1)  (y1)]
i
:
as the unique solution of y0 to (42) for a given y1. Note that h(ymax) = ymax. For any y1 2 (y^; ymax],
h0(y1) =

r
[u0(y1)  0(y1)]
0[h(y1)]
< 0:
Substituting y0 by its expression given by h(y1) in the left side of (41), we rewrite (41) as H(y1) = 0 where
H(y1) =
u0[h(y1)]  v0[h(y1)]
0[h(y1)]
+



u0(y1)  v0(y1)
u0(y1)  0(y1)

:
The function H(y1) is continuous and strictly increasing in (y^; ymax] with
lim
y1#y^
H(y1) =  1;
and, at y1 = ymax, we have
H(ymax) =
u0(ymax)  v0(ymax)
0(ymax)
+



u0(ymax)  v0(ymax)
u0(ymax)  0(ymax)

= [u0(ymax)  v0(ymax)]

1
0(ymax)
+



1
u0(ymax)  0(ymax)

> 0
because  <  [1  u0(ymax)=0(ymax)]. Thus, by Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique y1 2
(y^; ymax) such thatH(y1) = 0 and hence (41) holds for (h(y1); y1), and h(y1) > ymax as h is strictly decreasing
with h(ymax) = ymax. This proves that there exists a unique pair (y0; y1) with y^ < y1 < ymax < y0 < y that
satises (41) and (42).
Finally, because y^ < y1 < ymax < y0 < y and because (!0; y) = (!1; y0) with !1 = [u(y1) (y1)]=(1 )
is the solution to the maximization problem in (8)-(11) for ! = 0, V satises (34).
25
